Rethinking electronic communications : Europe and the others by PISARKIEWICZ, Anna Renata & SOLIDORO, Silvia
BR
IE
F
PO
LI
CY
Copyright:IStock/Jumpeestudio
Issue 2016/01 
November 2016
Rethinking Electronic 
Communications: Europe and 
the Others
Anna Renata Pisarkiewicz and Silvia Solidoro
Annual Conference
On 27 May 2016, the Florence School of Regulation,  
Communications and Media Area (FSR C&M)
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
San Domenico di Fiesole, Florence
On 27 May 2016, the Florence School of Regulation Communications 
and Media (FSR C&M) held its seventh Annual Conference. 
Following the adoption of the new Digital Agenda by the European 
Commission in May 2015, the event sought to look at ‘Europe and the 
Others’ to discuss whether the European Union has put in place the 
correct policies so as to seize the opportunities offered by the digital 
economy. The Conference was divided into three sessions, which 
dealt respectively with (i) experiences of other jurisdictions and the 
lessons to be drawn with respect to broadband deployment, the use of 
mobile technologies and data protection in the online world; (ii) risks 
and opportunities facing the European electronic communications 
sector in the near future and insights for reshaping and modernising 
European regulation; and (iii) challenges related to the Internet of 
Things (IoT) and online platforms. 
The event gathered different stakeholders together, which included 
representatives from National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), 
international organisations, academia, and industry, as well as law 
and consulting firms. The diversity of views ensured a lively debate. 
While participants agreed on various issues, the discussion revealed 
the need for further research on those issues that have as yet not been 
sufficiently explored. This policy brief summarises the main points 
raised during the discussion and seeks to stimulate further debate.
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Europe and the Others
The objective of the first session was to look beyond Europe 
and to discuss the experiences of other jurisdictions with 
a view to identifying interesting policy lessons that could 
be useful to further boost the widespread deployment 
and adoption of broadband technologies in Europe, and, 
more generally, to ensure that people and businesses can 
benefit from the opportunities brought by the Digital 
Economy. 
First, participants looked at broadband deployment in 
selected Asia/Pacific countries (in particular, Hong Kong, 
Korea, Japan, Singapore, New Zealand and Australia), 
and benchmarked them with the EU. This comparison 
revealed that although broadband has been widely 
adopted, it is not very evenly distributed. For example, 
in terms of mobile data, Finland not only uses more data 
than anyone else in the world, but also the difference 
between Finland and other countries is quite substantial. 
With respect to statistical international comparison, 
participants stressed that in order to properly reflect and 
compare the status of broadband markets in individual 
countries, policy makers must proceed with caution and 
must take into account a range of indicators; in particular 
penetration, usage, coverage, price, services and speeds.1 
Only with a wide range of broadband indicators, can 
policy makers design and put in place effective broadband 
policies. 
The discussion confirmed that levels of competition 
in national broadband markets continue to vary both 
among countries and between rural and urban areas 
within countries. In markets where end-users have a 
limited choice of broadband providers, prices for Internet 
access tend to be high. Participants also noted that there 
has been a remarkable evolution of broadband plans. For 
example, residential customers in Japan and Singapore 
are among the first to be offered 10 Gbps (at USD 90 and 
USD 131 monthly, respectively). 
With respect to broadband traffic and pricing, a much 
discussed issue is the so-called zero-rating. This practice, 
which can take various forms, consists of not charging 
subscribers with limited or metered data plans for data 
that is used by specific applications or Internet services. 
1. With respect to Internet speed, it is important to differentiate between 
the advertised speed and the actual speed that is provided by the Inter-
net Service Provider (ISP). 
Regulatory authorities across the world have adopted 
different approaches to zero-rating. While some consider 
it to be anti-competitive (as, among other things, it violates 
the principle of non-discrimination by a service provider 
with significant market power)2 or, in contravention of 
net neutrality regulations (i.e., Canada, Chile, India, the 
Netherlands), others have chosen to refrain from taking 
any action against such conduct. 
From an economic perspective, a distinction should be 
made between zero-rating that involves payment from 
content providers to Internet service providers, and zero-
rating that does not involve any direct payment. In the 
first case, it may be possible to identify zero-rating as part 
of an anti-competitive strategy on behalf of a powerful 
content provider who seeks to gain even more market 
power. The Internet service provider could, in this case, 
be neutral if the payment received compensates for the 
loss of revenue on the data user’s side. Often, though, 
zero-rating happens to occur in the second case, in which 
Internet providers initiate zero-rating programs to attract 
subscribers, riding on the positive network effects that 
powerful content providers trigger. In fact, the main pro-
competitive effect of zero-rating is that it allows firms to 
differentiate the products and services that they offer, 
and it generates positive network effects which, in turn, 
increase consumers’ welfare. As Eisenach notes: 
“Most zero-rating programs are carrier initiated and 
do not involve payments to carriers by the providers of 
the zero-rated content. Particularly in the absence of 
payments, zero-rating cannot plausibly be characterised 
as anticompetitive foreclosure by content providers. 
Rather, to the extent that carriers elect to include certain 
content providers in a zero-rating plan, the decision 
reflects the carrier’s unilateral determination that doing 
so improves the value of its platform”.3 
Zero-rating may be an optimal strategy that exploits 
the positive multi-sided network effects of an Internet 
provider’s platform. In this sense, it would not be anti-
competitive and may also be welfare enhancing.  Zero-
rating is likely to be less of an issue when it is adopted in 
competitive markets and where data allowances are high 
2. For example, if a given social media service is provided by mobile op-
erators for free, while users of other services have to pay for the data 
consumed while using the service, there is a risk that, in such a case, 
zero-rating may discriminate unfairly between services, thereby harm-
ing competition and limiting innovation. 
3. NERA Economic Consulting (2015), The Economics of Zero Rating by 
Eisenach, J.A. 
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or unlimited.4 Regulatory authorities, however, should be 
cautious, as zero-rating can have detrimental effects on 
competition among content providers in markets with 
limited competition and demand-side lock-in effects. In 
any case, zero-rating constitutes a departure from strict 
net neutrality, which some consider to be a threat to 
Internet growth. 
Attendees agreed on the need to analyse the compatibility 
of EU rules with domestic legal frameworks governing 
net neutrality, taking into account the ultimate goal of 
reaching a harmonised approach throughout the EU. 
Although, in some countries, such as the Netherlands, 
there are rules forbidding all price differentiation, 
so that no form of zero-rating is allowed, the new 
European regulatory framework seems to leave room for 
interpretation. BEREC guidelines are supposed to clarify 
most of the aspects that are located in this ‘grey area’.5 
Participants also discussed: (i) different forms of 
incumbent operators’ separation – functional, structural 
and ownership - that have been adopted over time in 
various Asian countries, (ii) the extent of private and 
public participation in broadband projects; and (iii) the 
impact of both on broadband deployment. It was noted 
that while separation of the incumbent’s wholesale and 
retail activities mostly concerned copper operations, 
recently this remedy has also been used in the context 
of Next Generation Access Networks (NGANs). The aim 
of the remedy is to prevent the accumulation of market 
power by firms deploying such networks, thereby limiting 
their ability to engage in anti-competitive behaviors. 
Structural separation with respect to NGANs has, for 
example, been adopted in Singapore, Australia and 
New Zealand. In these countries structural separation 
was preferred over functional separation as the latter 
was considered insufficient and/or inapplicable in the 
respective national contexts. 6 
Given the importance of broadband to the overall 
economy, various countries have decided to invest public 
funds to foster the development of communications 
markets. Public investment typically sought to extend 
4. OECD (2015) Digital Economy Outlook.
5. BEREC (2016), Draft Guidelines on the Implementation by National 
Regulators of European Net Neutrality rules.
6. Functional separation, which represents a stricter form of operational 
separation, requires the creation of so-called ‘Chinese walls’ to separate 
the incumbent\s wholesale division from its retail division. In Europe, 
for example, this model was adopted in the UK with Openreach. 
access to underserved, mostly rural, areas and to upgrade 
existing networks with very high speed lines in areas where 
intense service competition is possible.7  Participants 
deliberated about the right level of public investment in 
communications networks to reach a market structure 
that would leverage the necessary investment without the 
need for public intervention. 
Next, the Conference attendees discussed the extent to 
which the EU model of regulation, which is based on 
the concept of Significant Market Power (SMP), can be 
meaningfully applied in other jurisdictions, in particular, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, which in many aspects exhibits 
different geographic and socio-economic features 
than the EU. One of the main differences concerns the 
importance of mobile communication in relation to 
other technologies. In Africa, mobile communication 
allows more people to be connected than any other 
technology. For instance, fixed broadband with 9.8 
million connections has a penetration rate of 1.4 per cent 
whereas 198 million mobile broadband connections have 
a penetration rate of 17.2 per cent. 
Participants remarked that the EU SMP framework was 
based on the essential facilities doctrine, as it was initially 
thought of as a solution to monopoly problems that were 
raised by fixed infrastructure.8 However, the framework 
also applies to mobile communications markets. This 
implies that, as a matter of principle, the EU model 
does not necessarily need re-thinking in order for it 
to be applied in countries where the fixed network has 
scant penetration and is unlikely to become ubiquitously 
available. If properly understood and implemented, the 
SMP framework is sufficiently flexible to account for 
the specificities of mobile markets. However, in order 
to benefit from this flexibility, regulatory authorities 
need to have sufficient resources that will allow them 
to properly define relevant markets that are in need of 
regulatory intervention, instead of simply using the EU 
2003 or EU 2007 list of markets that are susceptible to ex 
ante regulation. The problem is that some countries may 
7. In New Zealand, for example, the government adopted the Ultra-Fast 
Broadband (UFB) Network initiative, under which it allocated NZD $1.5 
billion to FTHH deployment, with a view to reaching 75% of households 
and businesses. The remaining 25% should be reached under the Rural 
Broadband Initiative.
8. This is, of course, because fixed communications markets have tradi-
tionally been characterised by the presence of a monopolist incumbent 
who benefited from exclusive rights granted by the State. Accordingly, 
to address problems raised by the presence of such incumbents, the EU 
developed its regulatory framework on the premise that market failures 
had been caused by the accumulation of market power by one firm. 
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mechanically incorporate the forms of the EU model, 
without really embracing its substance and its main 
underlying principles. 
Participants acknowledged that effective enforcement of 
the EU regulatory framework is fully dependent on the 
independence of NRAs. Some participants remarked that 
the independence of the authorities seems to be working 
well as long as there is no economic and financial crisis. 
When independence is not assured, ensuring effective 
competition in the communications markets becomes 
particularly challenging, especially when, in a given 
country, there is no competition authority that will 
enforce competition law ex post. Lack of competition 
enforcement is important, in particular, in the light of the 
last criterion of the EU three criteria test, which is used to 
determine whether a given market should be regulated. 
The requirement is that competition law alone must be 
insufficient to adequately address a given market failure. 
Attendees finally concluded that while the EU electronic 
communications regulatory model has a number of 
advantages and is sufficiently flexible to be meaningfully 
applied in other jurisdictions, it also suffers from various 
shortcomings which need to be addressed. For example, 
functionally equivalent services are sometimes regulated 
differently.9 According to the BEREC Report, “OTT-1” 
services are defined as services that potentially compete 
with traditional electronic communications services, 
but that do not qualify as such. The EU electronic 
communications regulatory model may also not be best 
suited to address freemium products (or multi-platform 
businesses). In fact, in accordance with the definition 
provided by the Framework Directive 2002/21/EC, an 
electronic communications service is a service normally 
provided for remuneration (emphasis added). As such, 
freemium services fall outside the scope of the application 
of the Regulatory Framework. 
To conclude the first session, participants discussed 
potential privacy issues that are raised in the context 
of electronic communications. It was noted that the 
European Directive 2002/58/EC, also known as the 
‘e-privacy Directive’ complements the existing data 
protection regime and sets out more-specific privacy 
rights on electronic communications. The framework, 
in particular, covers: (i) marketing by electronic means, 
including marketing calls, texts, emails and faxes; (ii) 
9.  BEREC (2015), “Report on OTT services”, BoR (15) 142.
the use of cookies or similar technologies that track 
information about people accessing a website or other 
electronic services; (iii) the security of public electronic 
communications services, and (iv) the privacy of 
customers using communications networks or services as 
regards specific aspects. One of the aspects that certainly 
raises many questions is the extent of the territorial scope 
of the Directive in a context where local data protection 
authorities are increasingly scrutinising cross-border data 
processing transactions. There is a need for worldwide 
companies to identify exactly whether, and which, EU 
data protection law(s) apply to the processing of personal 
data that takes place either wholly or partially outside of 
the EU.
Participants pointed out that some of the Privacy and 
Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 
2003 (PECD) rules, which are directly derived from EU 
law and aim to implement the e-privacy Directive, only 
apply to organisations that provide a public electronic 
communications network or service. However, certain 
provisions may apply to firms, even if they are not a 
network or service provider. In particular, the PECD 
will apply if a company: (i) markets by phone, email, text 
or fax; (ii) uses cookies or a similar technology on their 
website; or (iii) compiles a telephone or a similar public 
directory. Participants also pointed out that while privacy 
has long been recognised as one of the fundamental 
social values, the emergence of a market for data calls 
for a better understanding of the value of that data and 
of how data protection regulation affects businesses. For 
example, it was noted that, in terms of marketing, the 
choice to use opt-in or opt-out as the default option has a 
significant impact on online firm’s revenues.10 
Europe looking at the future 
During the second session of the Conference, participants 
examined the evolution of the communications 
markets in the EU and the challenges facing both the 
market players and NRAs. In particular, the discussion 
focused on (i) the issues raised by the transformation 
of fixed communications markets from monopolistic to 
oligopolistic structures, and (ii) the challenges posed by 
the standard access regulation.
10. The terms ‘opt-out’ and ‘opt-in’ refer to options given to individuals to 
either avoid receiving unsolicited marketing materials, or to indicate 
their interest in receiving such materials.
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Fixed communications markets and the evolution 
from monopolistic to oligopolistic structures 
In Europe, one of the key objectives of the Digital Agenda 
is the transition to NGANs. First, participants reflected on 
the evolution of the communications markets in Europe, 
and, in particular, on how the situation has changed 
with the deployment of fibre. Whereas, in the past, 
national communications markets in the EU Member 
States were characterised by the presence of a single 
fixed infrastructure owned by the incumbent operator, 
nowadays, a number of markets can best be described as 
(tight) oligopolies, i.e., highly concentrated markets in 
which a few firms are dominant. In some countries, this is 
due to the head-to-head competition between cable and 
telecoms operators, which has completely changed the 
competitive dynamics of the sector. For example, in 2011, 
around 80 per cent of fibre lines were provided by new 
entrants, i.e., by cable firms, whereas in 2015, the fibre 
lines provided by such firms accounted for 55 per cent.
Participants conceded that whereas the concept of 
single firm dominance had come to be well understood, 
joint dominance, or tacit collusion, has always been, 
and continues to be, one of the most elusive concepts 
in European competition law. Given that fixed 
communications markets have moved away from 
the traditional notion of single dominance to more 
oligopolistic structures, participants pondered about 
whether there is any need to adapt the current regulatory 
framework in order to address potential competition 
problems that may arise in terms of joint dominance. The 
main concern was that if the concept of joint dominance 
is not properly used, the risk of collusion in the electronic 
communications sector may remain unaddressed, 
thereby causing harm to consumers.11  For example, in 
the Netherlands, the position of both the incumbent 
and the cable operators is equally balanced in terms of 
market shares, which illustrates the disappearance of 
the traditional single dominance position. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that the market is effectively 
competitive. Participants discussed whether the current 
regulatory regime is able to address this duopolistic 
situation in an optimal way, and they stated that it 
probably is not. In particular, there is a risk of potentially 
costly errors: if, following a withdrawal of access 
11. For analysis of competition issues that are raised by oligopolistic struc-
tures in the communications sector, see, for example, BEREC (2015), 
Report on oligopoly analysis and regulation. 
regulation, access seekers disappear from the market, 
then they will not return very easily, even if access 
regulation is reintroduced. Even in oligopolistic markets, 
access regulation cannot be considered useless. In fact, 
the total absence of regulation may lead to the creation of 
an environment that is quite conducive to coordination. 
Hence, the participants agreed that access regulation is 
still necessary. 
However, attendees also remarked that standard access 
regulation fails to adequately address the duopoly 
problem. Horstmann et al. (2016), for example, argue 
that a duopoly leads to suboptimal market outcomes, 
since it is prone to tacit collusion and produces high 
static inefficiencies.12 It was also noted that asymmetric 
regulation in a symmetrical duopoly may be inefficient 
as access regulation reduces the incentives of regulated 
telecoms firms to invest in respect of cable operators that 
are not subject to access regulation. 
An additional assessment was conducted using a 
comparative analysis of other markets, where there is 
no access regulation, as is currently the case in the US. 
One might wonder whether this market delivers the 
optimal outcome for consumers. Conference attendees 
came to the conclusion that it probably does not, taking 
into account the facts that prices are quite high and 
competition is scant. 
Finally, some participants submitted that, ideally, access 
regulation should secure markets with at least three 
infrastructure-based players since, with two players, the 
risk of tacit collusion and high static inefficiencies is high. 
However, when less than three fixed infrastructure-based 
operators effectively compete, all fixed infrastructure 
should be subject to sharing obligations. Such regulation 
should then be symmetrical so as to secure fair 
competition and investment incentives. It should also 
be imposed according to a division into different local 
areas, at one single access level per area, as well as per 
infrastructure. 
12. Horstmann, N., Kraemer, J. and Schnurr D. (2016), Number effects in 
oligopolies: How many competitors are enough to ensure competition? 
Working Paper. SSRN 2016. 
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The Challenges Posed by Standard Access Regulation 
The question of whether access is necessary in oligopolistic 
communications markets led to a wider debate about the 
degree to which regulators’ choices on access can shape 
the market. 
The Conference attendees noted that network access 
regulation continues being a topic of great impact. In the 
light of the European Commission’s public consultation 
on the evaluation and the review of the regulatory 
framework for electronic communications,13 the first 
strand of the debate focused on the analysis of the main 
trends that have recently emerged at the EU level. 
Participants stressed the importance of properly 
identifying circumstances that can justify access 
regulation, and they discussed how this regulation 
should look. They also remarked that two main views 
can be distinguished when analysing the results of the 
consultation. One is that of the incumbents arguing that 
lighter access regulation would increase returns, and 
therefore the incentives to invest. According to them, 
the ultimate result would be more dynamic competition, 
and, eventually, a better deal for users. On the other 
side, parties relying on regulated access claim that 
regulation is necessary in order to create competition, as 
long as it allows a sufficient level of investment. As both 
positions offer perspectives that are definitely interesting, 
everybody agreed that they would need to be balanced. 
Furthermore, as these two opposite views agree, at least 
on the necessity to ensure sufficient investments, this 
strand of the debate was followed by a discussion on the 
determination of the optimal level of competition that 
is needed to encourage a sufficient level of investment, 
as well as other challenges that are posed by standard 
access regulation. In particular, participants discussed 
the challenges posed by standard access regulation, such 
as: (i) the conflict among the various objectives of the 
regulatory framework, and investment as one of them; 
(ii) support of inefficient market structures by regulation, 
13. The above-mentioned consultation took place from 11th September, 
2015, to 7th December, 2015. The Commission launched it in order to 
gather input from Member States, its regional and local administrations, 
NRAs, technology providers and broadcasters, among others, with the 
objective of (i) aligning the general framework with the market and 
technological developments; and (ii) contributing to the Digital Single 
Market Strategy. 
and (iii) the lack of an adequate approach to collective 
dominance. 
First, concerning the impact of regulation on investment, 
conference attendees noted that while access regulation 
normally facilitates competition based on existing 
infrastructure, it deters private investment in NGANs, 
which should replace old networks. It was argued that 
under the standard access regulation regime, investment 
benefits are shared with competitors and, consequently, 
there is no incentive to invest, especially when private 
investors have to bear all the financial and policy risks 
themselves. Notably, the argument is supported by an 
extensive economic literature analysing the impact of 
competition on firm-level investment, as well as the 
strategic effects underlying infrastructure investment 
decisions. Bourreau et al. (2012), for instance, use game 
theory to analyse the incentives for incumbents and 
entrants to migrate from ‘old’ to ‘new’ technology, i.e., the 
NGA network.14 They find that NGA-related investment 
incentives are negatively impacted upon by access 
regulation charges in the ‘old’ copper networks.
Second, participants focused on the claim that standard 
access regulation supports inefficient market structures. 
It was recalled that the aim of the regulatory framework 
was to convert monopolistic into competitive markets, 
and that, accordingly, the framework was designed to 
unconditionally support entry. This view has been further 
reinforced by the EU case law on margin squeeze. 
Some participants, moreover, voiced concerns that with 
the ongoing convergence between fixed and mobile 
communications, there is a risk that the regulatory 
framework could result in duopolies. Given that the 
current framework does not secure fixed access for pure 
Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), there is a risk that 
they could be driven out of the market when, for example, 
two fixed network owners also have a mobile network 
and compete on the provision of convergent fixed-mobile 
offers. In such a case, a pure MNO could not survive in 
the market by serving mobile customers only. 
As for the wholesale price, it has been shown that the 
relevant cost standard for the Economic Replicability 
Test (ERT) is incompatible with the economics of NGA 
networks when including both fully fixed and variable 
14. Bourreau, M., Cambini, C. and P. Doğan (2012), ‘Access Pricing, compe-
tition and incentives to migrate from “old” to “new” technology’, Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organisation, vol. 30, pp. 713-723.
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kind of information about them is being collected; who 
controls the information collected and how it will be used. 
It is therefore essential that users are able to make a choice, 
which is to be understood as the ability to express the lack 
of consent to data collection. According to the EU’s new 
legal framework, which is contained in the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), consent must be (i) freely 
given, specific, informed and unambiguous; (ii) it must be 
expressed in a statement or by a clear affirmative action; 
and, last but not least, (iii) it should be easy to withdraw 
at any time without having to stop the use of the service 
provided.15 ‘Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity’ are 
also deemed inadequate to express consent, and so would 
an informed consent given by an individual in a position 
of subordination, e.g., an employee, since it is presumed 
not to have been ‘freely’ given.
A declaration to obtain consent must be presented 
“in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear 
and plain language and it should not contain unfair 
terms. For consent to be informed, the data subject 
should be aware at least of the identity of the controller 
and the purpose of the processing”.16 
However, as participants noted, with the proliferation of 
connected devices, the effectiveness of privacy policies is 
being seriously challenged. According to some research 
(McDonald and Crano, 2008), end-users would have 
to spend an average of 76 working days to read all the 
privacy policies that are encountered in one year.17 With 
intermittent attention, users are unlikely to fully appreciate 
privacy risks. The problem is further compounded by the 
fact that these complex and long privacy policies may 
become very ineffective when users access them on small 
screen devices. This is because the small size of a screen 
can make these privacy policies more difficult to read and 
understand. 
To fully understand the problem of privacy in the 
context of the IoT, one should think of these connected 
devices as a source of a great wealth of interconnected 
15. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2014), Opinion 8/2014 on the 
Recent Developments on the Internet of Things.
16. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27th April, 2016, on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and of the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), O.J. 
[2016] L119. 
17. McDonald, A. and L.F. Crano (2008), ‘The Cost of Reading Privacy Poli-
cies’, A Journal of Law and policy for the Information Society.
costs’ recovery for the access seeker. This entails that only 
the variable part of the wholesale price should be subject 
to the ERT, as otherwise the price will conflict with the 
risk sharing principle.
Finally, participants also reflected on issues raised by the 
coverage of non-profitable areas. In this context, it was 
pointed out that it is investment that is unprofitable, not 
the operations. This, in turn, implies that the need for 
public intervention should be limited to investment only. 
Finally, the Conference attendees raised the issue of 
how to solve the competitive bottleneck problem and to 
ensure consumers’ protection at the same time. In the 
Netherlands, for instance, the Authority for Consumers 
and Markets (ACM), which combines sector-specific 
regulation with competition powers, has a particular 
focus on generating improvements in consumer 
welfare. Within this framework, the ACM plays a key 
role by applying a problem-oriented approach to all the 
sectors that fall under the umbrella of its action-based 
competences, including electronic communications. 
Finally, attendees pointed out that consistent efforts are 
also required on the NRAs’ side in order to implement 
consumer protection.
Europe and Digital Technology
The final session of the Conference was preceded by 
a keynote speech that focused on the reassessment of 
regulation and the Internet of Things (IoT). 
The IoT is not a new concept, since the term had already 
been coined in 1999 by Kevin Ashton. It essentially refers 
to the system of interconnected devices that provide 
a whole spectrum of new and innovative services by 
transferring data over a network. While it is difficult 
to predict exactly how the IoT will evolve, it will most 
certainly affect numerous sectors of the economy to 
different extents and at different speeds. What is also 
certain is that the IoT is likely to create new regulatory 
challenges in various policy areas. 
The keynote speech focused on three main areas 
concerning privacy: (i) the collection and control of 
information; (ii) the effectiveness of privacy policies, and 
(iii) the need for a multi-level regulatory response. 
The first part of the debate dealt with privacy issues. 
Privacy policies are meant to ensure that users know what 
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information - both non-personal and personal - that can 
be tracked and used. Moreover, personal information 
can be analysed to identify patterns in people’s behavior, 
with the risk of being exploited. Participants agreed that 
adopting effective privacy policies and conveying to users 
meaningful information about potential privacy risks, 
will remain a formidable challenge tofor policy makers. 
Another serious concern that was discussed by the 
conference attendees was the impact that the IoT has 
on ‘intimacy’, given that connected devices allow for 
enhanced monitoring, tracking in public spaces and 
unconsented capture. Participants seemed to agree that 
as more data is now collected, regulation should give 
greater power and control to users. At the same time, 
producers should enrich their products with “privacy-
by-design” features to overcome the difficulties that users 
have in reading and enacting stricter privacy settings on 
their devices.
Given the qualitative and quantitative changes in the use 
of devices that has been brought by the IoT, participants 
agreed that policy makers should continue to take 
privacy very seriously. Moreover, in the light of the 
global character of the IoT, discussions about solutions to 
privacy issues should take place, not only at the national 
and regional levels, but also at the international level. 
After the keynote speech, the final session of the 
Conference ‘Europe and Digital Technology’ focused 
mainly on (i) online platforms and the Digital Single 
Market (DSM); (ii) the regulatory challenges of the IoT 
in the UK; and (iii) the importance of 5G for the delivery 
of new levels of on-device intelligence and integration.  
Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market 
As part of its DSM Strategy, the European Commission 
made several different announcements on the 25th May, 
2016. In particular, it adopted a new legislative proposal 
amending the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
(AMSD);18 which outlined a targeted, principles-based 
approach to online platforms;19 and proposed new 
18. “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provi-
sions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member 
States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services in view of 
changing market realities”, COM/2016/0287 final. 
19. “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, Online Platforms and the Digital Single Mar-
ket Opportunities and Challenges for Europe”, COM/2016/0288 final.
e-commerce rules to help consumers and firms reap the 
full benefits that are offered by the Single Market.20
Online platforms feature prominently in the Commission’s 
agenda as they play an essential role in the DSM Strategy. 
They are strong drivers of innovation, increased consumer 
choice, the improved efficiency and competitiveness of 
the industry, and they can enhance civil participation in 
society. Online platforms, which can operate in two or 
multi-sided markets and across geographic borders, often 
provide free services to consumers. They are already 
subject to existing EU rules in areas such as competition, 
consumer protection and Single Market freedoms.
Given the diversity of online platforms in terms of size, 
type of services offered, business model or the sector 
in which they operate, it is not surprising that there is 
still no single all-encompassing definition. One possible 
set of definitions, proposed by Godlovitch et al.,21 
distinguishes between managed and online (unmanaged) 
services. While for managed services the network 
operators typically have some control over the quality 
of the service (QoS) delivered, the main characteristic of 
online (unmanaged) services is that network operators 
usually have a very limited influence over the QoS. OTT 
services, which compete to some degree with traditional 
telecommunications or broadcasting services, fall under 
the latter.
Conference attendees reviewed the approach that has 
been adopted by the European Commission concerning 
online platforms in order to discuss the overall principles 
governing the matter. They agreed that future regulatory 
measures proposed at the EU level must address clearly 
identified problems relating to a specific type or activity 
of online platforms, pointing out that principles-based 
20. On 25th May, 2016, the European Commission tabled a package of 
measures to allow consumers and companies to buy and sell products 
and services online across the EU more easily and confidently. This so-
called “e-commerce package” is composed of: (i) a legislative proposal to 
address unjustified geoblocking and other forms of discrimination on 
the grounds of nationality, residence or establishment; (ii) a legislative 
proposal on cross-border parcel delivery services to increase the trans-
parency of prices and to improve regulatory oversight; (iii) a legislative 
proposal to strengthen the enforcement of consumers’ rights and guid-
ance to clarify, among other things, what qualifies as an unfair commer-
cial practice in the digital world. It is worth mentioning that the package 
complements two legislative proposals on the supply of digital content 
and on online and other distance sales of goods, which the Commission 
proposed in December 2015, and the upcoming VAT simplification pro-
posal that is planned for autumn 2016.
21. Godlovitch I., Kotterink B., Marcus J.S., et al (2016), ‘Over the Top Play-
ers: Market dynamics and policy challenges”, study for the IMCO Com-
mittee of the European Parliament.
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self-regulatory and co-regulatory measures can also play 
a role. 
Attendees concluded that, as a matter of principle, 
similar services that compete with one another should be 
subject to similar obligations. However, this seemingly 
straightforward principle is difficult to apply in practice. 
In order to put in place adequate regulatory measures, 
therefore, it is necessary to understand, firstly, how 
online platforms differ from other online services, 
and whether regulatory obligations governing online 
platforms and other online services should differ. The 
second step is to ponder whether there are inappropriate 
asymmetries between OTT services and other Electronic 
Communications Services (ECS) today, and, should 
the answer be ‘yes’, whether they can be reduced by (i) 
selective regulation; and/or (ii) a shift away from sector-
specific regulation to horizontal regulation; and/or (iii) 
an effective revision of horizontal regulation (e.g., making 
current sector-specific end-users’ rules protecting not 
only the consumers, but also other end-users, such as 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). 
Finally, participants noted that the great majority of large 
online service providers are US-based. Although Europe 
is not inherently weak, the continent still faces a few 
challenges in the online services markets. The weakness 
of European entrepreneurial culture, the complex and 
inconsistent taxation and the resistance to process 
changes, among other things, certainly represent some of 
the main issues with which players need to deal. 
Certainly, there are signs of recovery, but, overall, results 
are mixed. In fact, while, in terms of online services, 
start-ups in Europe are almost closing the gap with the 
United States, scale-ups, i.e., start-ups seeking to grow 
their business to the next level, have so far not been 
equally successful.
The Internet of Things:  Regulatory issues in the UK
Next, participants discussed regulatory challenges raised 
by the IoT from the UK’s perspective. The IoT services, 
which affect many industries, ranging from healthcare, 
agriculture to energy, communications, and many 
others, have the potential to bring significant benefits 
to consumers. To ensure that these benefits are fully 
delivered, in 2014, Ofcom published a call for input, with 
a view to identifying the potential barriers to investment 
and innovation in the IoT and the role that Ofcom could 
play in helping to overcome these barriers. Following 
the feedback received from various stakeholders, Ofcom 
identified four priority themes: (i) data privacy and 
consumer literacy, (ii) network security and resilience, 
(iii) the availability of spectrum for IoT networks, as well 
as (iv) telephone number and address management.22 
In terms of data privacy and consumer literacy, Ofcom 
concluded that future developments in the IoT sector 
require a framework under which consumers would 
be able to authorise the conditions under which data 
collected by their devices is used and shared by others.23 
With respect to network security and resilience, an 
increasing use of IoT services will require further 
improvements, not only in respect of the resilience of the 
networks, but also of secure storage and the processing of 
collected data. 
In terms of spectrum, although Ofcom does not 
currently consider spectrum availability to be a barrier 
to the development of the IoT, it acknowledges that it 
is necessary to monitor its evolution, as the spectrum 
requirements for the IoT services, in the longer term, 
are still uncertain. In the short to medium term, existing 
initiatives should be sufficient to meet spectrum demand 
for IoT services. These initiatives include, for now, 
making available spectrum in the 870/915MHz bands 
and liberalising licence conditions for existing mobile 
bands. The general consensus was that, as the IoT sector 
develops, in the longer term there may be a need to make 
new bands available. Finally, in respect of addressing the 
network, Ofcom concluded that instead of telephone 
numbers, IoT services “will likely either use bespoke 
addressing systems or the IPv6 standard”.24 
Participants then made some concluding observations 
about the challenges faced by the IoT. First, they stressed 
that while regulation is unlikely to drive the further 
evolution of the IoT, competent regulatory authorities 
should ensure that they do not hamper it. Second, given 
that heterogeneity is one of the most striking features 
of the IoT, “any steps taken to promote investment and 
innovation in the IoT will need to acknowledge this 
diversity”.25 In particular, the success of the IoT will 
22. See, for example, Ofcom (2015), Promoting investment and innovation 
in the Internet of Things: Summary of responses and next steps. 
23.  Ofcom (2015). 
24.  Ofcom (2015). 
25.  Ofcom (2015).  
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depend on open and interoperable standards, since 
the IoT encompasses a heterogeneous collection of 
technologies. Some of these technologies are licence-free, 
whereas others are not. The international harmonisation 
of spectrum and standards is also expected to bring 
significant benefits as it will help to achieve international 
economies of scale and lower costs for consumer 
equipment. Finally, in terms of institutional interactions, 
there is scope to bring different parties together.
5G and the delivery of new levels of on-device 
intelligence and integration
Last, but not least, participants discussed the role of 5G 
in the context of the EU Digital Single Market. It was 
recalled that 5G is expected to constitute the backbone 
of the EU Digital Single Market as it is a kind of network 
that offers a huge potential that has yet to be unleashed. 
It enables new services and an empowering new user 
experience. However, the key challenge is to put in place 
predictable policies, both at the EU and at national levels, 
which will lead to an actual deployment of 5G. Various 
participants agreed that the success of 5G depends on 
secure and reliable standards that are essential to ensure 
the interoperability of systems. Standards, in fact, are seen 
as the foundation of an effective Digital Single Market, 
which is reflected by the fact that 5G standards are one of 
the five priority areas under the EU’s “Digitising European 
Industry” initiative.26  However, the main challenge is 
that the landscape for 5G and IoT standards is currently 
rather fragmented.
26.  For more information on the initiative please visit Digitising European 
Industry website.
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